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WRESTLING WITH PUNISHMENT:
The Role of the BC Court of Appeal  
in the Law of Sentencing
Gerry Ferguson and Benjamin L .  Berger 1
INTRODUCTION
Sentencing is often portrayed, in the media, as a postscript to the real stuff of criminal justice: the investigation and trial of crime. To be sure, if one is looking for drama, it is most readily 
found in the excitement of the investigative process or the stylized 
thrust and parry of the adversarial criminal trial. Yet, as is the case in 
so many areas of the law, it is the remedial dimension of the law – its 
“business end” – that discloses most about its nature. It is in fact the law 
of sentencing that provides the most direct window into the theories 
and assumptions animating the criminal justice system as a whole. 
Equipped with a broad range of forms and durations of punishment, 
the sentencing judge is asked to craft a just and effective sanction. But 
any assessment of the justice and efficacy of a sentence presumes an 
orienting point by reference to which a judge can set his or her sentencing 
compass. This orienting point depends upon social views about the 
nature of individual responsibility and just and appropriate collective 
responses to wrongdoing. As views on these matters shift, so too do 
the practices of sentencing. 
 With this in mind, it is remarkable that sentencing has been and 
continues to be a relatively “lawless” practice. Historically, little legis-
lative guidance has been available to the sentencing judge on either the 
aims and purposes of criminal punishment or the fit form and quantum 
of punishment for given offences, apart from the comparatively few 
instances in which Parliament has prescribed a minimum sentence. The 
1995 amendments to the Criminal Code appear to speak to this absence of 
guidance, listing the aims and principles that should guide sentencing; 
but this list has amounted to just that – a kind of buffet of objectives 
 1 Professors Ferguson and Berger wish to thank Mr. Ryan Bortolin and Ms. Lyndsay Watson 
for their invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this article.
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and principles leaving sentencing judges in much the same position as 
before the amendments, responsible for selecting one or more of these 
objectives. In the end, the sentence in a given case turns overwhelmingly 
on the theory of criminal justice adopted by the particular judge before 
whom the accused finds him or herself.
 This situation, combined with a strong tradition of giving a very large 
measure of deference to the sentencing judge’s decision, has put courts 
of appeal in a unique and important position. Bound by this principle 
of deference but aware of the need to articulate some basic principles to 
guide the practice of sentencing, courts of appeal have played an active 
role in debating and expounding theories of crime and punishment by 
which judges can set their sentencing compasses. As a result, in their 
decisions on the appropriate ends and means of punishment, one finds 
in appellate pronouncements a uniquely rich source in which to chart 
shifting social views on the aims, purposes, and practices of sentencing. 
This article looks at the role and the work of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal (bcca) in this area since the court was first given 
jurisdiction to hear sentence appeals in 1921. In the three broad periods 
that we canvass, we draw out the sometimes surprising, often unique, 
and frequently provocative ways in which the bcca has, over its history, 
wrestled with the practice of criminal punishment and, with it, the basic 
assumptions of our system of criminal justice.
THE EARLY YEARS: 1921-49
Modest Guidance in Respect to Sentencing
As already stated, Parliament has traditionally provided very little 
guidance to sentencing judges in their important task of imposing a fit 
sentence. The sentencing framework under Canada’s first Criminal Code, 
enacted in 1892, was pretty threadbare. It amounted to the following: 
(1) capital punishment was restricted to nine offences; (2) a maximum 
term of imprisonment was specified for all other offences; very few of-
fences specified any mandatory minimum punishment; (3) fines were 
separate stand-alone sanctions for minor offences or could also be added 
as an additional sanction to terms of imprisonment; and (4) whipping 
was available as an additional punishment to imprisonment for ap-
proximately ten serious offences. Apart from specifying the maximum 
penalty, this legislative framework provided no real guidance to sen-
tencing judges since (1) the Criminal Code did not set out a statement 
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of either the aims and objectives of sentencing or the aggravating and 
mitigating factors that should guide the determination of a fit sentence; 
and (2) the maximum sentences that were specified in the Criminal 
Code were generally set quite high to cover “the worst case scenario” 
and therefore provided no guidance on the appropriate sanction for an 
average, rather than extreme, example of the offence in question.
 In short, sentencing was left to the unfettered discretion of the sen-
tencing judge’s own philosophy and attitude towards sentencing. The 
severity of a sentence depended more on who the judge was than on 
the gravity of the offence and the circumstances and blameworthiness 
of the offender.2 This potential for unwarranted sentencing disparity 
was magnified by the fact that there was no right of appeal from the 
sentence imposed by the trial judge until 1921.3 And even after sentence 
appeals were established in 1921, appellate guidance and review in regard 
to sentencing remained fairly limited for a number of reasons. First, 
sentence appeals were relatively infrequent. In the first twenty-five years 
after the initiation of sentence appeals, there were on average only two 
reported sentencing appeal decisions per year from the bcca.4 Second, 
those reported sentence appeal decisions were quite brief – on average 
one page or less. Generally they confirmed or varied the sentence under 
appeal with little or no explanation of the sentencing objectives, prin-
ciples, and factors that justified their conclusion. 
 This relative lack of guidance in the bcca’s sentencing decisions can be 
illustrated by reference to whipping cases. As already noted, the Criminal 
Code indicated that whipping was a discretionary additional punishment 
that the sentencing judge could impose in respect of a small number of 
serious offences. Canada-wide statistics on whipping for the five year 
period 1930-34 indicate that judges imposed whipping very selectively as 
an additional punishment in 29 percent of rape convictions, 13 percent of 
robbery convictions, and 4 percent of indecent assault convictions.5  Under 
such circumstances, one might expect that clear guidance would and 
should be given to sentencing judges by the Court of Appeal regarding 
the criteria to be used in deciding whether to impose whipping. This 
did not happen. In each of the four cases between 1925 and 1949, where 
 2 See J. Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).
 3 See s. 1013(2) of the Criminal Code, S.C. 1921, c. 25 as amended by S.C. 1923, c. 41. Although 
there was no general right to appeal a sentence until 1921, prior to that time a writ of error or 
a writ of habeas corpus could be filed to challenge the legality of a sentence. 
 4 There may have been other unreported sentence appeals. 
 5 Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, Final Report on Corporal 
Punishment, Debates of the Senate 1956 (Hansard) at 872-85. The statistics in this report do 
not include whipping for drug offences and armed burglary.
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the fitness of a sentence of whipping was under consideration, the bcca 
summarily concluded that whipping was or was not a fit sentence without 
any discussion of the criteria or general principles that judges should use 
in deciding whether whipping was appropriate. 
 A third explanation for the lack of appellate guidance in sentencing 
cases is the very deferential approach that the appeal court took to sen-
tences imposed by trial judges. Although the Criminal Code indicated 
that the Court of Appeal “shall consider the fitness of the sentence 
appealed against,” that appeal function was narrowly construed. In 
R. v. Zimmerman,6 the first bcca decision on sentencing, the court re-
ferred to and followed the practice in England and elsewhere in Canada 
that an appeal court should not vary a sentence unless that sentence 
applied a wrong principle or was clearly wrong in the sense that it was way 
too harsh or way too lenient, considering all the circumstances. The fact 
that the appeal judges were of the opinion that a different sentence would 
have been preferable was not a sufficient reason to vary the sentence. The 
limited scope for appellate review set out in Zimmerman was consistently 
cited as the guiding principle in subsequent bcca sentencing cases. 
Prevailing Sentencing Objectives: Retribution and Deterrence
Punishment is first and foremost associated with retribution. In legal 
terms, retributive punishment is the deliberate infliction of pain, suf-
fering, or deprivation on morally responsible offenders for their culpable 
violation of criminal laws. It is the criminal justice system’s way of 
righting the wrong. The sentencing cases decided by the bcca before 1949 
make it clear that their decisions were governed by a sense of retribution 
and the hope and expectation that the retributive punishment would 
have a denunciatory and deterrent impact. The court’s decisions never 
cited rehabilitation as a primary sentencing objective and mentioned it 
only once in the late 1940s.7
 6 (1925), 46 C.C.C. 78 (B.C.C.A.).
 7 See R. v. Cruickshanks (1946), 63 B.C.R. 102 (C.A.). 
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THE NEXT QUARTER CENTURY: 1950-75
A Modest Increase in Appellate Guidance
As the number of sentence appeals to the bcca increased in the third 
quarter of the century, the court began to issue more detailed judgments 
that set out some general principles and guidelines for sentencing. For 
example, in R. v. Dupont,8 the accused was convicted of armed robbery 
for the second time and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment 
and to be whipped with a paddle on two occasions with ten strokes 
each time. He appealed against the whipping. The bcca quashed that 
sentence and commented for the first time on the principles that should 
govern whipping sentences. Wilson J.A., speaking for two of the three 
appellate judges, referred to R. v. Childs,9 in which the Ontario Court 
of Appeal criticized the backward and outdated nature of whipping and 
held that judges should impose whipping only in very exceptional cases. 
Wilson J.A. took exception to these remarks, arguing that Parliament, 
not judges, should decide whether whipping should be discontinued and 
that refusing to impose whipping because a judge found it personally 
distasteful improperly usurped a legislative function. Second, he noted 
that, in cases in which whipping was imposed as a suitable punishment, 
the court might properly reduce the length of imprisonment that might 
otherwise be imposed if whipping were not part of the sentence. Third, 
in regard to the rationale for whipping, he stated: 
With deference, I think that whipping is not to be decreed as a 
measure of retribution, but only as a deterrent. Where the actions of 
the prisoner have shown a callous and brutal disregard for the suf-
ferings and indignities he has imposed upon other persons then it may 
be that one way of bringing home to him what his victim has suffered 
and thus deterring him, is to expose the prisoner to pain and indignity. 
This I conceive to be at least part of what parliament had in mind in 
authorizing judges to order whipping.10
Finally, on the facts of this case, he noted that the offender used no 
brutality in his offence (in fact, he restrained brutality by his accomplice), 
and there were no other features of the robbery that would justify the 
addition of a sentence of whipping to an appropriately severe sentence 
of seven years imprisonment. 
 8 (1962), 39 W.W.R. 217 (B.C.C.A.).
 9 (1939), 71 C.C.C. 70 (Ont.C.A.).
 10 (1962), 39 W.W.R. 217 (B.C.C.A.) at 223.
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 The bcca’s decision in R. v. Hinch and Salanski11 in the late 1960s was 
another example of the court’s setting out general objectives and prin-
ciples of sentencing as guidance for subsequent cases. The two accused 
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obtain money from BC Hydro by false 
pretences. They agreed to pay kickbacks (approximately $20,000 over 
an eight-month period) to a BC Hydro employee who threatened to 
deny them further construction contracts unless they did so. The two 
accused were experienced businessmen with no prior criminal records 
and were well respected in their small-town communities. The trial 
judge characterized the two accused as victims of the unscrupulous BC 
Hydro employee and imposed one-month imprisonment and a $2,000 
fine on each of them. Measured against existing precedents, these were 
very lenient sentences. The Crown appealed. Somewhat surprisingly, 
a majority of the bcca held that the trial judge had not made an error 
in principle and that the sentences were not so low as to warrant the 
interference of the court.12 In the course of its judgment, the majority 
specified the objectives of sentencing as (1) the safety of the public; 
(2) the deterrent effect of a sentence; (3) punishment of the offender; and 
(4) reformation and rehabilitation of the offender. However, the court did 
not indicate how a trial judge should determine which objective(s) should 
be given priority. The court also waded into the debate over whether 
retribution and vengeance are appropriate sentencing objectives,  stating 
that “retribution” is too easily confused with vengeance, which involves 
a loss of objectivity, and concluding that the word “retribution” “is mis-
leading and is to be deprecated.”13 The court also listed seven factors to 
be taken into account in reviewing the fitness of a sentence.14 
 11 [1968] 3 C.C.C. 39 (B.C.C.A.).
 12 The dissenting judge, Robertson J.A., held that the trial judge did err in treating the two 
accused as hapless victims, that a one-month sentence was a wholly inadequate deterrent 
to others, and that any sentence of less than eighteen months would not be an adequate 
deterrent.
 13 Hinch, supra note 11 at 55.
 14 Ibid. at 44-45, where the majority stated “the following factors are among those to be considered 
by this Court in reviewing the sentences: (1) The degree of premeditation involved; (2) The 
circumstances surrounding the actual commission of the offence; (3) The gravity of the crime 
committed in regard to which the maximum punishment provided by statute is an indication; 
(4) The attitude of the offender after the commission of the crime as this serves to indicate 
the degree of criminality involved and throws some light on the character of the participant; 
(5) The previous criminal record, if any, of the offender; (6) The age, mode of life, character 
and personality of the offender; (7) Any recommendation of the trial Judge, any pre-sentence 
or probation officer’s report, or any mitigating or other circumstances properly brought to 
the attention of this Court.”
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 Finally, R. v. Switlishoff 15 is a remarkable illustration of both ap-
pellate deference and of the bcca’s willingness to forego long sentences 
of imprisonment on the theory that they may sometimes do more harm 
than good. In this case, six Sons of Freedom Doukhobors were convicted 
of three serious acts of arson arising out of a clash of ideology with the 
mainstream Doukhobor community. The sentencing judge, Manson J., 
widely viewed as particularly severe in matters of sentencing, imposed 
remarkably lenient sentences on the offenders, ranging from one day 
to three months. He noted that the offenders were repentant and had 
promised they would not repeat these offences and that severe sentences 
imposed on radical Doukhobors in the past had failed to deter them and 
engendered a sense of grievance. He held that leniency had a real chance 
of accomplishing what severity had not in the past. The Crown appealed 
and the majority of the bcca upheld these sentences. O’Halloran J.A., 
for the majority, after referring to the principle of appellate deference in 
Zimmerman, stated: 
Were the sentences adequate? That depends upon all the surrounding 
circumstances. There is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a 
particular crime. No doubt in somewhat similar circumstances it is 
desirable to avoid marked disparity in sentences. But the individual 
himself and his surrounding conditions cannot be ignored …16 
The Doukhobors have been a problem. They have been dealt with 
severely in the past, both in large and small groups, for failure to 
obey Canadian laws. The Piers Island temporary penitentiary was 
an outstanding example, when hundreds of them were incarcerated. 
But severe sentences have neither reformed them nor deterred them. 
Manson J. became convinced that leniency might accomplish what 
severity failed to do in the past. He believes by reason of what he has 
seen and heard as the assize judge that, outside some “outlaws,” the 
Doukhobors may now be responsive to leniency. He may be right or he 
may be wrong but this Court plainly cannot say he is one or the other. 
If he is right posterity may acclaim him as a great judge, far-seeing 
beyond his generation. If he is wrong, he cannot be much more wrong 
than many other capable judges and administrators in the past who 
have relied on severity that has failed in its purpose.17 
 15 (1950), 97 C.C.C. 132 (B.C.C.A.).
 16 Ibid. at 136.
 17 Ibid. at 138. It is interesting to note that Justice O’Halloran seems to lump all Doukhobors 
together in his assessment of the issues, a common perspective among non-Doukhobors of 
the time.
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 In so ruling the bcca both underscored the principle of appellate 
deference to sentencing decisions and resounded a note of scepticism 
about the efficacy of long sentences of incarceration.
The Emergence of Rehabilitation as a  
Correctional and Sentencing Objective
During this period, rehabilitation emerged gradually as a significant 
objective, first in correctional policy and then in sentencing. By the 1950s, 
there had been a significant shift in correctional policy:18 imprisonment 
was no longer viewed solely as punishment; it should include as much 
as possible rehabilitation, which, in turn, necessitated a transformation 
in prison programming and expertise. New “reform” institutions were 
established in British Columbia, including New Haven, the Young Of-
fenders Unit at Oakalla Prison, and, later, the Haney Correctional Insti-
tution. These reform institutions were modelled on the British “borstal” 
system, which provided intensive programs of education, training, 
and instruction for young offenders in specially created correctional 
institutions with the overriding objective of rehabilitating these youths. 
There was optimism that rehabilitation, especially of young offenders 
and first offenders, could occur in these specialized prison programs.19 
This shift towards rehabilitation in correctional policy was accompanied 
by two important legislative changes that allowed judges to take a more 
rehabilitative approach to sentencing: (1) the enactment of a Probation 
Act for British Columbia and (2) the creation of indeterminate sentences 
for young offenders in British Columbia. 
 Increased Use of Suspended Sentences and Probation
In 1946, British Columbia enacted a Probation Act, which put in place 
the beginnings of a probation service staffed by professional probation 
officers who could supervise offenders in the community.20 Probation 
quickly became a popular sentencing option for trial judges and the bcca 
 18 This shift in correctional policy is set out in detail in D. Doherty and J. Ekstedt, Conflict, Care 
and Control: The History of the Corrections Branch in British Columbia (Vancouver: Institute for 
Studies in Criminal Justice Policy, Simon Fraser University, 1991).
 19 By 1958, New Haven was claiming a rehabilitation rate of 80 percent for the more than five 
hundred young offenders treated there during the past ten years. By 1962-63, these success 
rates were downgraded to 62 percent for New Haven, 64 percent for Haney, and 70 percent 
for Gold Creek Forestry Camp. Success was measured by the narrow criterion that the young 
offender had not re-entered the correctional system for at least one year after his or her release. 
See Doherty and Ekstedt, Conflict at 92-93 and 102. 
 20 Probation Act, S.B.C. 1946, c. 60.
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supported the use of probation for rehabilitative purposes. For example, in 
R. v. Allen,21 the trial judge imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment 
on the offender for three counts of indecent assault on young girls. The 
bcca, on the advice of a psychiatric expert who indicated that the offender 
would not benefit from imprisonment, quashed the prison sentence and 
placed the offender on probation for two years, with the requirement that 
he attend the Crease Clinic for psychotherapy. And in R. v. Bludoff,22 
the offender was convicted of stealing gas over a two-year period to a 
value of more than $20,000. Notwithstanding that this type of offence 
would normally result in a prison sentence, the magistrate imposed a 
suspended sentence and probation and the bcca upheld that sentence, 
applying its normal deferential approach. However, the bcca made it 
clear that a suspended sentence and probation was not acceptable in those 
cases in which a court decided that general deterrence was the primary 
sentencing objective. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
bcca attempted to stamp out the rapid increase in marijuana use among 
young people by imposing harsh sentences designed to deter both the 
offender and others. In R. v. Budd,23 R. v. Hartley and McCallum,24 and 
R. v. Adelman,25 the bcca indicated that sentences of six months 
imprisonment should be imposed on the offenders, all of whom were 
college students and first time offenders. For example, although the 
sentencing judge had imposed a suspended sentence on Adelman (who 
had a master’s degree and was studying for another), the bcca over-
turned that sentence. In its view, the primary purpose of sentencing was 
to control the incidence of crime through punishment and this could 
be accomplished by deterring others and rehabilitating the offender. 
However, the court held that rehabilitation was a secondary objective 
in circumstances where severe sentences are necessary to bring a rapidly 
increasing offence under control. Notwithstanding their concern for the 
adverse consequences of sending these young offenders to jail, the court 
held that sentencing judges could not allow a criminal law to be broken 
frequently with impunity. Obviously, the court considered the use of 
fines and probation in such cases as virtually equivalent to impunity.26 
 21 (1954), 108 C.C.C. 239 (B.C.C.A.). 
 22 (1960), 129 C.C.C. 264 (B.C.C.A.).
 23 Unreported, B.C.C.A. January 15, 1965.
 24 (1968), 63 W.W.R. 174 (B.C.C.A.).
 25 (1968), 63 W.W.R. 294 (B.C.C.A.).
 26 The court did leave open the possibility that there might be exceptional cases where probation 
could be a fit sentence for possession of marijuana. 
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Adelman set the standard for imposition of jail sentences on first time of-
fenders for simple possession of marijuana for the next several years.27 
 Indeterminate Sentences
To facilitate rehabilitation of young adult offenders, the BC government 
requested that the federal government amend the Prisons and Reforma-
tories Act to authorize the use of indeterminate sentences for young of-
fenders in British Columbia. The new provision, enacted in 1948,28 gave 
BC judges the power to sentence male persons aged sixteen to twenty-two 
to a definite term of imprisonment between three months and two years 
less a day and an additional indeterminate period thereafter of not more 
than two years less a day to be served “in New Haven, instead of the 
common gaol.”29 The new provisions under the Prisons and Reformatories 
Act also created a BC Parole Board, which was authorized to release 
the young offender on parole at the optimum rehabilitative moment 
during the indeterminate portion of his sentence. And the New Haven 
Act30 specified that the newly created institution called New Haven 
should be for the custody and detention of young persons “with a view 
to their education, training, and reclamation.” As the court noted in 
R. v. Adams,31 the rehabilitative purposes of the new provisions were 
clear. They were designed “to provide a means of segregation of certain 
youthful offenders from hardened criminals, and of making every effort to 
reclaim such offenders from a life of crime by methods which could only 
succeed in the most favourable surroundings set apart from a crowded 
prison such as Oakalla.”32 Likewise the court in R. v. Moss indicated that 
 27 In R. v. Bruckshaw, (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 133 (B.C.C.A.), where the accused had bought an 
ounce of hash and cut it into smaller pieces for his own use and also to sell a couple of pieces 
to his friends, Robertson J.A., concurred in by Nemetz and Branca JJ.A., stated: “It goes 
against the grain to send an otherwise nice boy to prison, where he must come in contact 
with persons of the most undesirable kind. But the quantity of a narcotic that a nice boy sells 
does just as much harm to its user as the same quantity sold by a depraved adult, and it is the 
potential users of drugs that the Court’s policy is primarily directed to protecting” (137).
 28 Prisons and Reformatories Act, RSC 1927, c. 165, amended by S.C. 1948, c. 26, which added ss. 
147A to 147C. Ontario was the only other province that had a determinate/indeterminate 
sentencing scheme.
 29 The Prisons and Reformatories Act was subsequently amended in 1951 to authorize indeterminate 
sentences to be served in the Young Offenders Unit at Oakalla and in 1958 to be also served 
at the Haney Correctional Institute.
 30  Stats. B.C. 1949, c. 45.
 31 (1950), 98 C.C.C. 53 (B.C.S.C.).
 32 Reference Re Adams, [1950] 2 W.W.R. 614 at 617 (B.C.S.C.).
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the new provisions were “directed to a special object, viz., the efficient 
administration of the Borstal system in British Columbia.”33
 It is apparent from reading the cases that some judges, in order 
to provide correctional authorities with adequate time to carry out a 
program of rehabilitation, were imposing longer determinate/inde-
terminate sentences under the Prisons and Reformatories Act than they 
would have done had the offender been sentenced under the general 
sentencing laws.34 The longer sentences were considered appropriate since 
rehabilitation was seen to be in the best interests of both the offender and 
society and because there was an expectation that parole would normally 
be granted for a portion of the indeterminate sentence. Interestingly, in 
R. v. Holden,35 the bcca stated that it is “quite wrong” to impose longer 
sentences on adult offenders solely for rehabilitative purposes, leaving it to 
the Parole Board to release such offenders at the optimum rehabilitative 
point in their sentences. The court stated that “no greater sentence should 
be imposed than the nature of the offence requires when it is considered 
in the light of the attendant circumstances and established principles.”36 
However, the court expressly stated that its comments in this regard did 
not apply to determinate/indeterminate sentences on young offenders 
under the Prisons and Reformatories Act. 
 As time passed, the conflict between the principle of proportionality 
and the practice of imposing longer sentences for rehabilitative 
purposes under the Prisons and Reformatories Act came to a head. In 
R. v. Turcotte,37 the offender was sentenced to a definite term of eighteen 
months imprisonment plus an indeterminate term of two years plus a 
day. But the maximum punishment for the offence in question under 
the statute creating the offence was only eighteen months. By reliance 
on the Prisons and Reformatories Act, the trial judge had sentenced the 
offender to two years longer than the maximum sentence prescribed for 
that offence. A majority of the bcca held that such an application of 
the Prisons and Reformatories Act was contrary to the legislative intent 
of the Act. Surprisingly, a five to four majority of the Supreme Court of 
 33 R. v. Moss (1951), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 688 at 689 (B.C.C.A.).
 34 See, for example, R. v. Moss, ibid., where the Court of Appeal altered an eighteen-month 
definite sentence in Oakalla to a six-month determinate sentence and a two-year-less-one-day 
indeterminate sentence in New Haven. Conversely, where the Court of Appeal was of the 
view that the trial judge overemphasized deterrence and retribution and gave insufficient 
consideration to reformation, it reduced an aggregate sentence of six years imprisonment to 
a sentence of twelve months definite and twelve months indeterminate. See R. v. Courtney 
(1956), 115 C.C.C. 260 (B.C.C.A.).
 35 [1963] 2 C.C.C. 394 (B.C.C.A.).
 36 Ibid. at 396-97.
 37 (1969), 69 W.W.R. 705 (B.C.C.A.), reversed [1970] S.C.R. 843.
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Canada (scc) overturned the Court of Appeal and held that the interpre-
tation placed on the Prisons and Reformatories Act by the sentencing judge 
was correct. Thus young offenders, in the name of rehabilitation, could 
be sentenced to longer maximum sentences than adult offenders.
 Four years later the same issue was before the courts in R. v. Burn-
shine.38 This time the offender argued that the imposition of a deter-
minate/indeterminate sentence under the Prisons and Reformatories Act 
that was longer than the maximum sentence set out in the statute creating 
that offence and that only applied to male persons in British Columbia 
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-two was a violation of equality 
before the law under s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. A majority of the 
bcca agreed with that submission and held that the determinate/indeter-
minate provision of the Prisons and Reformatories Act was inoperative. The 
majority held that treating offenders in British Columbia under the age of 
twenty-two more harshly than similar offenders in other parts of Canada 
was indeed a denial of equality under the law. Once again, on further 
appeal, a six to three majority of the scc set aside the bcca’s progressive 
judgment and held that there was no infringement of the offender’s right 
to equality before the law. The majority of the Supreme Court, in effect, 
justified its amazing conclusion on the basis that the young offenders in 
question were not being treated “more harshly” since the determinate/
indeterminate provisions under the Prisons and Reformatories Act were 
enacted for legitimate rehabilitative purposes.
 Soon after the bcca issued its judgment in Burnshine declaring that 
determinate/indeterminate sentences were a violation of the Bill of Rights, 
the new ndp provincial government’s interest in these types of sentences 
waned, and it was not revived when the scc declared, a year later, that 
those sentences were indeed legal. Instead, in 1975, the BC government 
closed Haney Correctional Institution, and Parliament formally 
abolished determinate/indeterminate sentences in 1978. The closing of 
Haney marked a shift in the government’s penal policy reflecting the 
view that rehabilitation could be achieved more effectively through 
community-based, rather than jail-based, programs. The government 
believed that these community-based programs could be implemented 
by greater use of temporary absence programs, parole, halfway houses, 
probation, and community service orders.39
 38 (1973), 22 C.R.N.S. 271 (B.C.C.A.), reversed (1974), 25 C.R.N.S. 270 (S.C.C.). For a critique 
of the scc decision, see W. Conklin and G. Ferguson, “The Burnshine Affair: Whatever 
Happened to Drybones and Equality before the Law?” Chitty’s Law Journal 22 (1974): 303-13.
 39 Doherty and Ekstedt, supra note 18 at 137-39.
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MODERN TIMES: 1975 TO THE PRESENT
The Sentencing Role of Appellate Courts 
The number of sentencing appeals coming before the bcca continued 
to increase rapidly during this most recent period. Yet matching this 
trend in increased workload on sentencing matters was an equally robust 
and continuing trend in favour of significant appellate deference on 
sentence appeals. Although some appellate courts were becoming more 
interventionist in the 1970s and 1980s,40 the scc strongly reasserted, in a 
series of cases in the 1990s and thereafter, that appellate courts must pay 
great deference to the sentencing judge’s choice of sentence.41  
 This combination of a marked increase in the number of appeals and 
great appellate deference towards the sentences meted out by sentencing 
judges meant that the chief influence of appellate courts was in the 
broad articulation of principles and objectives that ought to guide sen-
tencing judges. Indeed, until 1995 when Parliament passed Bill C-41,42 
which added new sections to the Criminal Code outlining the objectives, 
purposes, and principles of sentencing, appellate courts were the key 
source of legal guidance on the ends that we purport to seek with the 
imposition of criminal sanctions. And since the scc seldom entertained 
sentence appeals on the sole issue of the fitness of a given sentence,43 
provincial appellate courts were in most instances courts of last resort on 
issues of sentencing. Not surprisingly, these appellate courts frequently 
held very divergent opinions on the approach that one should take to 
 40 This more active approach to appellate review was facilitated by appellate courts establishing 
starting points or ranges for particular types of offences. See, for example, R. v. Sandercock 
(1985), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 79 (Alta. C.A.). However, appellate statements of starting point sen-
tences was somewhat frowned upon in R. v. McDonnell, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948. In R. v. Stone, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 290, in which the practice of appellate courts setting sentencing “ranges” for 
particular categories of offences in order to minimize sentencing disparity was approved of, 
Justice Bastarache nevertheless cautioned that “in attempting to achieve uniformity, appellate 
courts must not interfere with sentencing judges’ duty to consider all relevant circumstances 
in sentencing” (para. 244). See also BC Chief Justice Farris’s remarks in “Sentencing” (1976) 
18 Crim. L.Q. 421 at 422.
 41 See R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227; R. v. M.(C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500. In a BC Court of 
Appeal case in 2000, McEachern C.J.B.C. expressed the opinion that the Supreme Court’s 
recent jurisprudence on appellate deference “unduly limits the proper exercise” of the right 
of appeal and can lead to unfair or unjust sentences being upheld. See R. v. Mafi (2000), 142 
C.C.C. (3d) 449 at para. 39 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 180. 
 42 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof ), S.C. 
1995, c. 22.
 43 Although the Supreme Court does not grant leave to appeal a sentence on the basis that it is 
unfit, it does entertain a limited number of sentence appeals that involve questions of law or 
significant sentencing principles. See, for example, R. v. Gardiner (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 477 
(S.C.C.). 
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criminal sentencing. During this period, appellate courts were also acting 
in an environment in which there was vigorous public, governmental, 
and academic discussion on how to navigate and balance the divergent 
philosophies of punishment variously at play in the system. The Law 
Commission of Canada and other legal reform institutions were, in the 
1970s and thereafter, actively engaged in researching and suggesting 
sentencing models.44 The appellate judgments of this time were, thus, 
engaging with this energetic body of debate and reform literature, not 
least of which was the 1987 Report of the Canadian Sentencing Com-
mission, chaired by Judge Archambault.45 
 In this context, appellate courts attempted to balance and reconcile 
the two broad constellations of principles outlined thus far in this article: 
(1) the traditional model of deterrence- and retribution-based sentencing 
predominant in the early years and (2) the ethic of rehabilitation that, 
although unsuccessful in the particular form that it first took in British 
Columbia, was nevertheless very much still in the air in the late 1970s 
and beyond. Needless to say, the bcca decided many important technical 
points of sentencing law in this period. However, it is on these broader 
philosophical questions – questions about the orientation of the system 
of punishment as a whole – that the bcca adopted unique and important 
positions in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Some of these 
cases reflect the shape that our modern law has ultimately taken, whereas 
others now stand out as marking sentencing roads not taken.
The BC Court of Appeal on the Objectives of Sentencing
The 1995 amendments to the Criminal Code came after many years in 
which appellate courts wrestled with and developed their own approach 
to the objectives of criminal punishment. The period between the mid-
1970s and 1995 was a particularly active time for the bcca in coming to 
terms with the various – and often competing – objectives of sentencing. 
Here, we focus upon four key contributions of the court to the debate 
about the aims and purposes of sentencing in the time leading up to 
and immediately following the 1995 amendments. 
 44 For a summary of the various reports and bodies engaged in assessing the sentencing system in 
Canada, see Gerry Ferguson, “From Jeremy Bentham to Anne McLellan: Lessons on Criminal 
Law Codification,” in Don Stuart, Ronald J. Delisle, and Allan Manson, eds., Towards a 
Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1999) 
192 at 208-10.
 45 Canadian Sentencing Commission (Archambault Commission), Sentencing Reform: 
A Canadian Approach (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987).
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 Questioning Deterrence 
As already discussed, retribution and the notion of specific and general 
deterrence was the backbone of sentencing law in the early years of the 
bcca’s work. In the late 1970s, however, one finds the bcca struggling 
with and questioning the utility of deterrence as an objective of criminal 
punishment. Consider, for example, the 1977 case of R. v. Harrison and 
Garrison.46 The accused were convicted of robbery and given suspended 
sentences that included two hundred hours of community service. The 
Crown appealed, conceding that the accused had themselves learned their 
lesson but arguing that the principle of general deterrence – discouraging 
others from committing similar crimes – mandated an increase in 
sentence. In the course of dismissing the Crown appeal, Chief Justice 
Farris offered provocative remarks on the nature of general deterrence. 
Referring to and adopting comments that he made on another occasion, 
Farris C.J.B.C. expressed the view that “general deterrence is a by-
product of the whole system of justice and not necessarily an aim of any 
particular sentence.”47 Rather than emphasising the severity of individual 
punishment, Chief Justice Farris reasoned – wisely, in our view – that 
“[p]revention follows from awareness of the system and of the efficiency 
of its operation,”48 appealing to the reason of some and to the fear of 
others, thus creating a deterrent effect. As a result, “[t]he effectiveness 
of the principle of general deterrence (such as it is) is not diminished by 
refusing to imprison a person who should not be imprisoned.”49 
 This critical stance towards deterrence is somewhat remarkable viewed 
from within the current political climate in which so much criminal 
justice policy is driven by the assumed efficacy and predominance of 
this objective. Yet it is a view supported by much social-scientific lit-
erature that suggests that the likelihood of being caught is a far more 
effective route to deterrence than severity of punishment, which has 
marginal effect at best. Chief Justice Farris’s decision, thus, offered 
the possibility of marginalizing a heavily invoked but dubious aspect 
of our sentencing system. Unfortunately, the impact of this decision 
would be short-lived. In the 1981 case of R. v. Campbell,50 and “[a]fter 
anxious reflection,” Chief Justice Nemetz expressly overruled Harrison, 
stating that it “should no longer be followed.”51 Indeed, he stated that 
 46 [1978] 1 W.W.R. 162 (B.C.C.A.).
 47 Ibid. at 164.
 48 Ibid.
 49 Ibid.
 50 [1982] 1 W.W.R. 739 (B.C.C.A.).
 51 Ibid. at 741.
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“where a serious offence involving violent crime has been committed … 
deterrence to others is not only an important factor in sentencing but 
should be the prime consideration taken into account.”52 Chief Justice 
Nemetz substituted a period of incarceration for the suspended sentence 
imposed by the sentencing judge. Although the court would later clarify 
that the decision in Campbell did not mean that imprisonment was the 
only means of achieving general deterrence,53 it also confirmed the idea 
that deterrence is not only still a key objective of criminal punishment 
in British Columbia but also the prime consideration in serious offences.54 
In R. v. Mulvahill 55 the court explained that, “[a]lthough thoughtful 
questions have been raised from time to time as to whether sentences 
imposed for some crimes do in fact deter others,” pursuing deterrence 
by means of a severe sentence was appropriate for serious crimes and for 
those in which “there is a high degree of planning and pre-meditation, 
and where the offence and its consequences are highly publicized.”56
 In 1992, the bcca decided the case of R. v. Sweeney,57 which it viewed 
as an important opportunity to undertake a full re-examination of the 
objectives and principles governing criminal sentencing in the province. 
To facilitate the free reassessment of sentencing law and theory, the court 
sat as a panel of five, which gave it the liberty to depart from past rulings.58 
Justice Wood issued separate reasons concurred in by Chief Justice 
McEachern. These concurring reasons are remarkable inasmuch as they 
offer a clear and systematic assessment of the purposes and objectives of 
sentencing, drawing heavily from the report of the Canadian Sentencing 
Commission, three years before the introduction of Bill C-41. 
 Interestingly, Wood J.A. expressed deep scepticism about the theory 
of general deterrence. In this respect, his position was more radical than 
that of the Commission, which had cautiously accepted deterrence as 
a sentencing objective. “The problem with the theory,” Wood J.A. ex-
plained, “lies in its extension to the conclusion, which I believe has been 
too easily accepted in the past, that the greater the sanction imposed in 
any given case, the greater will be its general deterrent effect.”59 Justice 
Wood, very much echoing Chief Justice Farris’s concerns articulated 
 52 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
 53 R. v. Schell and Moran, [1982] 1 W.W.R. 682 at 690 (B.C.C.A.). 
 54 See, for example, ibid. at 690. 
 55 (1993), 21 B.C.A.C. 296.
 56 Ibid. at para. 28.
 57 (1992), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 82 (B.C.C.A.).
 58 Justice Wood explained this in the opening words of his judgment. See Sweeney, ibid. at 
89.
 59 Ibid. at 98-99.
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in 1977, cites “an increasingly persuasive body of evidence and learned 
opinion” against the general deterrent effect. Yet it remains a substantial 
component of our modern law and politics of sentencing, and the scc has 
itself adopted a formula very much similar to that enunciated in Campbell, 
giving a privileged position to deterrence in cases of serious crime.
 Wrestling with Denunciation
Chief Justice Farris commented in Harrison that it is “the moral sense 
of the community which substantially achieves the objective of the 
prevention of crime.”60 Interestingly, despite his difference with Farris 
C.J.B.C. on the deterrence point, in his separate concurring reasons in 
Campbell, Justice Taggart similarly endorsed the notion that “a sentence is 
imposed because it reflects the revulsion of society against the particular 
offence.”61 What is the role of “the moral sense of the community” and 
“revulsion” for particular acts in a just sentencing regime? The bcca has 
wrestled with this issue as a matter of the appropriate role of denunciation 
as an aim of the law of sentencing. 
 In this period of substantial debate about the purposes of sentencing, 
the morally communicative aspect of criminal sentences was endorsed 
early by Chief Justice Farris in the 1977 case of R. v. Oliver.62 The case 
involved a lawyer who was convicted of misappropriating over $300,000 
from trust funds. He was given a ninety-day sentence to be served in-
termittently (i.e., on weekends). The Crown appealed, arguing that this 
sentence was unfit. Chief Justice Farris agreed and imposed a sentence 
of four years incarceration. The principal justification for this radical 
increase in the severity of the sentence was the objective of denunciation, 
the sense of revulsion felt by the community at the breach of the moral 
standards of the criminal law. He explained as follows:
Courts do not impose sentences in response to public clamour, nor in 
a spirit of revenge. On the other hand, justice is not administered in 
a vacuum. Sentences imposed by courts for criminal conduct by and 
large must have the support of concerned and thinking citizens. If they 
do not have such support, the system will fail. There are cases, as Lord 
Denning has said, where the punishment inflicted for grave crimes 
should reflect the revulsion felt by the majority of citizens for them. 
In his view, the objects of punishment are not simply deterrent or 
 60 Harrison, supra note 46 at 164.
 61 Campbell, supra note 50 at 742.
 62 [1977] 5 W.W.R. 344 (B.C.C.A.).
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reformative. The ultimate justification of punishment is the emphatic 
denunciation by the community of a crime.63
 Chief Justice Farris’s acceptance of denunciation while putting into 
question deterrence points to an important fault line in the theory of 
sentencing. One may reject a utilitarian approach to sentencing while 
strongly embracing a morally expressivist sense of the ends of criminal 
punishment. 
 Yet, while accepting denunciation as a legitimate aspect of criminal 
sentencing, the bcca has reflected a certain caution about heavy reliance 
upon it. In R. v. Pettigrew,64 the court was faced with the case of an 
alcoholic woman who, while drunk and attempting to remove bullets 
from a firearm, killed the man with whom she was living. She was 
convicted of manslaughter and the sentencing judge imposed a one-year 
custodial sentence, noting that “courts have to mark the taking of a life 
in a way that’s significant to members of society”.65 Ms. Pettigrew ap-
pealed, arguing that imprisonment solely for the purposes of denunciation 
was unwarranted. Justice Taylor, writing for the majority of the court, 
conceded that denunciation, or punishment “as expression or reflection of 
society’s ‘abhorrence at,’ or ‘rejection of,’ the conduct of the offender”66 is 
a legitimate part of the sentencing process. Yet Justice Taylor emphasized 
that denunciation must be assessed in the context of the given case and 
that a sentencing judge must consider any adverse effects that a denun-
ciatory sentence might have on the rehabilitation of the offender. Faced 
with a Métis offender with no prior criminal record and afflicted with 
alcoholism, Justice Taylor concluded that “a sentence based wholly on 
‘denunciation,’ ‘rejection’ or ‘abhorrence,’” was, in his view, “difficult to 
justify.”67 He allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence. 
 In Sweeney, Justice Wood confirmed this cautious approach to the 
use of denunciation as a justification for punishment. He argued that 
denunciation was but a mechanism to achieve what he, along with the 
Canadian Sentencing Commission, concluded was the fundamental 
purpose of sentencing: proportionality between the gravity of the offence 
and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as measured by “the moral 
culpability of the offender’s conduct.”68 As such, “denunciation, as a goal 
of sentencing, must be strictly limited to ensuring that sentences imposed 
 63 Ibid. at 346.
 64 (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 390 (B.C.C.A.).
 65 Quoted in ibid. at 393. 
 66 Ibid. at 394. Justice Taylor here cites the Archambault Commission in support.
 67 Ibid. at 397.
 68 Sweeney, supra note 57 at 97.
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for criminal convictions are proportionate to the moral culpability of the 
offender’s unlawful act.”69 Why this deep caution around the objective 
of denunciation, a caution not frequently detected in contemporary 
sentencing law? The answer is found in Justice Wood’s recognition that 
denunciation is an objective “associated with the retributive theory of 
sentencing”70 and in the bcca’s unique and fascinating debate on the 
legitimacy of retribution in our system of criminal punishment.
 What Role for Retribution?
In the 1968 case of R. v. Hinch and Salanski,71 discussed above, the bcca 
took a strong position against the legitimate place of “retribution” in 
a modern system of criminal punishment. In that case, Justice Norris 
reasoned that “the use of the term ‘retribution’ as a factor in sentencing 
is misleading and is to be deprecated”72 as it reflected a sense of societal 
vengeance meted out against an offender and a concomitant loss of 
objectivity “not in accord with the present-day concept of the purposes 
of the criminal law.”73 
 Yet to accept, as the court did from the late 1970s into the 1990s, the 
idea that denunciation – or the expression of abhorrence or revulsion of 
society at the breach of its moral code – has a legitimate role to play in a 
just system of criminal punishment but to reject the idea of the infliction 
of punishment for retributive purposes is a fine jurisprudential line to 
walk. Thus, by the early 1990s, and no doubt precipitated by its various 
decisions endorsing the concept of denunciation, the bcca was faced 
with a series of cases that put the hard question of whether retribution 
was, indeed, a legitimate aspect of the sentencing process.
 One finds in the cases at this time a rich discussion surrounding 
the concept of retribution. On the one hand, in certain cases the court 
seems to take the position that “retribution” is merely an old and perhaps 
outdated term used to designate the legitimate end of denunciation. This 
is the view of Taylor J.A. in Pettigrew, who wrote that denunciation, 
 69 Ibid. at 103 (emphasis added). See also R. v. Hicks (1995), 56 B.C.A.C. 259, in which Lambert 
J.A. explained that the overriding principle of sentencing must be “that the sentence must 
be commensurate with the gravity of the offence” (para. 13) and that denunciation is only 
“a proper factor to consider and apply in order to lead to a sentence that is consistent with 
the overriding principle that the sentence must be commensurate with the gravity of the 
offence” (para. 14).
 70 Sweeney, supra note 57 at 103.
 71 [1968] 3 C.C.C. 39 (B.C.C.A.).
 72 Ibid. at 44.
 73 Ibid. 
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a legitimate factor in the sentencing process, is simply “not spoken of 
today as ‘retribution,’”74 but it still captures the idea of the infliction of 
a penalty in response to society’s “abhorrence at” or “rejection of ” the 
conduct of the offender. In a later case, R. v. Eneas,75 Justice Southin, 
writing a majority opinion from which Wood J.A. dissented, voiced even 
more explicit support for the legitimate role of retribution in sentencing, 
arguing that the key distinction is that between “retribution,” which is an 
aspect of sentencing, and “revenge,” which is not. She described revenge 
as “what the family of the victim wants for its own loss” and concluded 
“of that the law takes no account.”76 By contrast, Southin J.A reasoned 
that “retribution is what society demands as an expression of its own 
moral code”77 and is, thus, essential to the criminal law. One sees the 
close link drawn between retribution and denunciation in her thought 
when she explains that “[t]he moral code of any society finds some of its 
expression in the criminal law”78 and that retribution serves the end of 
expressing abhorrence at the breach of this moral code. Justice Southin 
wrote that a judge is entitled to gauge the moral outrage that retribution 
legitimately reflects not only by reference to the Criminal Code but also 
by reference to the “thoughts, feelings, and attitudes of the rest of the 
community.”79 In a resonant turn of phrase, she explained that retribution 
as a component of criminal sentencing is a legitimate response to the 
fact that “the community is outraged by mindless violence, especially 
by mindless violence ending in death, and expects a killing to be expiated 
by a substantial term of imprisonment.”80 By means of retribution, she 
seems to be arguing, criminal punishment legitimately serves as a kind 
of sacrificial atonement for the moral sins of the offender.81
 But the weight of authority in the bcca stood against retribution 
as a legitimate purpose of sentencing. The conceptual struggle for the 
judges taking this position was to meaningfully distinguish this aim 
from that of denunciation. This is clear in the 1992 judgment of Wood 
J.A. in R. v. Hoyt.82 Justice Wood refers to and endorses the rejection 
of retribution as a principle of sentencing in R. v. Hinch and Salanski, 
 74 Pettigrew, supra note 64 at 394.
 75 [1994] B.C.J. No. 262 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 154.
 76 Ibid. at para. 47. 
 77 Ibid. at para. 47.
 78 Ibid. at para. 48.
 79 Ibid. at para. 49. 
 80 Ibid. at para. 49 (emphasis added).
 81 Justice Wood dissented vigorously from this reasoning, stating: “I do not accept that retribution 
can be distinguished from revenge, nor do I agree that the theological notion of expiation 
has anything to do with modern day principles of sentencing.” See ibid. at para. 55.
 82 (1992), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (B.C.C.A.). 
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stating that none of the court’s jurisprudence could be said to have 
retreated from that position. His stance against retribution is firm, and 
he states that “there is no meaning theoretical or otherwise … which 
can give retribution any role in a principled approach to sentencing.”83 
He explains: “At best it is a concept which is incapable of any objective 
standard of application. At worst it subverts the rule of law which, in a 
civilized community, stands between the offender and the understandable 
and quite natural instinct of revenge which arises both in the victim and 
in all who identify with the victim.” In the case at hand, Justice Wood 
read the sentencing judge’s reference to retribution as an “inadvertent 
slip of the tongue”;84 the trial judge was, in Wood J.A.’s view, actually 
invoking the legitimate purpose of denunciation. In Hicks,85 Lambert 
J.A. underscored the legitimate role of denunciation but characterized the 
distinction between denunciation and retribution as a matter of degree: “It 
is when denunciation goes further and results in a sentence that is more 
severe than is required in order to be proportionate to the gravity of the 
offence that denunciation turns from an applicable sentencing principle 
into retribution or revenge, neither of which is appropriate.”86 
 The contours of this engaging debate in the bcca are clear. Retri-
bution is a problematic aim of sentencing that sits somewhere between 
illegitimate vengeance and the accepted purpose of denunciation. For 
those judges who accepted the role of retribution, it was but a rephrasing 
and legitimate form of denunciation – the desire to express, through 
criminal punishment, the moral disapprobation of the community. On 
the other side, and reflecting the weight of authority from the bcca, 
judges who rejected retribution distinguished it from denunciation 
precisely in its slide to revenge.87
 Although the bcca would ultimately reject retribution as a legitimate 
component of our criminal justice system, in R. v. C.A.M.,88 the scc 
disagreed. C.A.M. was a horrific case involving multiple counts of 
egregious sexual violence. The sentencing judge had imposed a sentence 
totalling twenty-five years, but a majority of the bcca reduced the 
sentence by approximately seven years on the basis that this sentence 
 83 Ibid. at 296.
 84 Ibid. at 297.
 85 Supra note 69.
 86 Ibid. at para. 14.
 87 See, for example, R. v. D.E.S.M. (1993), 80 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (B.C.C.A) at para. 22, in which a 
unanimous bench of five defines retribution as punishment “motivated primarily by a desire 
to exact revenge.” “This approach,” the court explains, “has long been rejected by the Courts 
and by Parliament as a principle of sentencing.”
 88 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500.
bc studies46
offended the court’s general rule that consecutive sentences should not 
exceed a total of 20 years in custody. In the course of his reasons, Justice 
Wood also reiterated the position of the court that retribution is not a 
legitimate goal of sentencing, referencing “[t]he fine line which separates 
the legitimate denunciatory objective from its illegitimate retributive 
cousin,”89 and he also referred to the practice in the United States, 
under the banner of retribution, of imposing sentences totalling several 
hundred years imprisonment, a practice that, to Justice Wood, “with 
respect, can only be regarded as both absurd and uncivilized.”90 But the 
scc overruled the bcca’s decision, restoring the sentence of twenty-five 
years imprisonment. In the course of its reasons, the scc also held that 
the Court of Appeal had erred in concluding that retribution is not a 
legitimate principle of sentencing.
 In the scc’s view, retribution “is an accepted, and indeed important, 
principle of sentencing in our criminal law.”91 Chief Justice Lamer, 
writing for the court, explained that “[r]etribution, as an objective of sen-
tencing, represents nothing less than the hallowed principle that criminal 
punishment, in addition to advancing utilitarian considerations related 
to deterrence and rehabilitation, should also be imposed to sanction the 
moral culpability of the offender.”92 Yet the Supreme Court did not follow 
the path of the BC dissenters who would tie retribution to denunciation, 
nor did it reject the concerns expressed by those BC justices who were 
so very uneasy with its ready association with vengeance. Instead, the 
scc explained that, unlike vengeance, which is “an uncalibrated act of 
harm upon another, frequently motivated by emotion and anger, as a 
reprisal for harm inflicted upon oneself by that person,” retribution 
“represents an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an 
appropriate punishment which properly reflects the moral culpability of 
the offender.”93 Yet retribution, the scc explains, is also distinct from 
denunciation. Whereas denunciation is a symbolic expression of the 
community’s condemnation of the conduct in question, retribution is 
about properly reflecting the moral culpability of the offender.94 
 89 R. v. C.A.M. (1994), 28 C.R. (4th) 106 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 29.
 90 Ibid. at 30.
 91 Supra note 88 at para. 77.
 92 Ibid. at para. 79.
 93 Ibid. at para. 80 (emphasis in original). 
 94 Interestingly, in the 1995 sentencing amendments, Parliament did not use the word “retri-
bution” in listing the aims and objectives of sentencing. That having been said, Section 718 
of the Criminal Code specifically mandates the imposition of “ just sanctions,” sanctions that, 
according to s. 718.1, “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of 
responsibility of the offender.” In effect, although it did not adopt the language of “retribution,” 
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 One can take issue, as we would, with the distinctions drawn here 
by the scc, particularly the extent to which emotion and reason, cali-
bration and the seeking of harm, lie comfortably or stably on one side 
of the vengeance/retribution division that the court draws. But for 
present purposes, the most interesting dimension of this judicial debate 
about retribution is that it highlights the bcca’s role in wrestling with 
the ends of the criminal justice system, a task that has forced it – and 
other appellate courts – to be expounders of social theory as much as 
jurisprudence.
 A Renewed Commitment to Rehabilitation
The failure and abandonment of the borstal-style reformatories in British 
Columbia did not put an end to rehabilitative intentions in criminal 
sentencing in the province. From 1975 onwards, the rehabilitative ethos 
shifted to one that sought the use of non-custodial means of encouraging 
the reformation and reintegration of the offender as a responsible and 
safe member of society. Over these years the sentencing objective of 
rehabilitation took on a strongly non-custodial connotation and, indeed, 
became the principal counterweight against sentencing considerations, 
such as deterrence and denunciation, that might lead to a punishment 
involving incarceration. Alongside the scepticism about deterrence and 
anxiety about retribution in the court’s jurisprudence over this period, 
one finds by the 1990s a strong sense in the bcca’s sentencing juris-
prudence that the harshness of punishment should, whenever possible, 
bend to the imperative of rehabilitation.
 In R. v. Preston,95 for example, the court wrestled with the relationship 
between deterrence and rehabilitation in the context of an accused who 
had been convicted of her twenty-fourth drug-related offence. Justice 
Wood, who clearly played an important role in BC sentencing law 
during this period, accepted that the overall goal of the criminal justice 
system must be the protection of society and that if incarceration is the 
only means by which this protection can be achieved, this option must 
be used. However, writing for a panel of five, Wood J.A. reasoned that, 
“where, as in this case, the danger to society results from the potential 
of the addict to commit offences to support her habit, and it appears to 
the court that there is a reasonable chance that she may succeed in an 
Parliament’s description of the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing mirrors 
the logic of the Supreme Court of Canada in C.A.M. 
 95 (1990), 79 C.R. (3d) 61 (B.C.C.A.).
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attempt to control her addiction, then it becomes necessary to consider 
the ultimate benefit to society if that chance becomes a reality.”96 In 
Justice Wood’s opinion, allowing for this chance not only offers the 
possible permanent protection of society but may also avoid the costs 
associated with the frequent incarceration of someone suffering from 
an addiction. At a time when our jails are swelling with individuals 
incarcerated for drug-related crimes, it is instructive to reflect back on 
Justice Wood’s “grave doubts”97 that incarceration for possession holds 
any hope for specific or general deterrence of addicted offenders. The 
court speaks of “the ultimate futility of the short-term protection which 
the community enjoys from a sentence of incarceration” and argues that, 
in cases such as Preston, “the principle of deterrence should yield to any 
reasonable chance of rehabilitation which may show itself to the court 
imposing sentence.”98 
 Justice Taylor, writing in Pettigrew,99 came to a similar conclusion 
with respect to the relationship between the goal of denunciation and 
that of rehabilitation. Justice Taylor did not limit himself to minor or 
drug-related offences. Indeed, as noted above, Pettigrew was a case of 
manslaughter.100 Nevertheless, in this case that otherwise endorsed the 
use of denunciation as a legitimate component of criminal sentencing, 
the bcca stated that a key question in the imposition of a denunciatory 
sentence had to be “whether any adverse effects which a denunciatory 
punishment would have on the rehabilitation of the offender can be 
justified in the overall interest of the protection and advancement of 
society.”101 
 Yet the most vigorous defence of rehabilitation and the consequences of 
the logic of rehabilitation on the use of incarceration came in Sweeney.102 
Justice Wood, writing for himself and Chief Justice McEachern, stated 
that “[i]t has long been recognized that rehabilitation, as a goal of the 
sentencing process, cannot be achieved through the imposition of cus-
todial sentences.”103 Given our heavy reliance upon incarceration, one 
might be led by this statement to conclude that rehabilitation must be a 
secondary or subsidiary goal of our justice system. Yet Wood J.A. drew 
the opposite conclusion, placing rehabilitation at the core of the bcca’s 
 96 Ibid. at 70.
 97 Ibid. at 71.
 98 Ibid. at 72 (emphasis added).
 99 Supra note 64.
 100 See text accompanying note 64, above.
 101 Ibid. at 395.
 102 Supra note 57.
 103 Ibid. at 101.
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theory of sentencing. Since “rehabilitation remains the only certain 
way of permanently protecting society from a specific offender,”104 “if 
the rehabilitation of a specific offender remains a reasonable possibility, 
that is a circumstance which requires the sentencing court to consider 
seriously a non-custodial form of disposition.”105 Justice Wood made clear 
that this principle ought to apply to serious criminal offences, presenting 
the possibility that a significant prospect of rehabilitation “may outweigh 
the perceived general deterrent advantages of a custodial sentence.”106 
 None of this should suggest that, in the 1990s, the bcca was aban-
doning the use of custodial sentences. In cases where the protection of 
the public could reasonably be achieved only through incarceration, the 
court had no hesitation imposing carceral sentences.107 Yet in the early 
1990s, the court was strongly advancing the notion of the parsimonious 
use of incarceration on the principled basis that the protection of society 
is better served by rehabilitated, rather than isolated, offenders.108 With 
the passage of Bill C-41 in 1995, the Criminal Code reflected this view, ar-
ticulating the principle that “an offender should not be deprived of liberty, 
if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances”109 
and that “all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are rea-
sonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with 
particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders”.110 
 Although these principles of restraint are sadly underutilized in 
current sentencing practices, the bcca did play an important role in 
the development of these principles in the context of the sentencing of 
Aboriginal offenders in a case called R. v. Gladue.111 The case involved 
an Aboriginal woman who pled guilty to manslaughter for killing her 
common law husband in a drunken fit of jealousy. The sentencing judge 
imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment, expressly refusing to 
give weight to the accused’s Aboriginal status, as suggested by s. 718.2(e), 
on the basis that the she was living off-reserve. The court unanimously 
 104 Ibid. 
 105 Ibid.
 106 Ibid.
 107 See, for example, R. v. Robitaille (1993), 31 B.C.A.C. 7.  
 108 In this respect, the court was mirroring the Archambault Commission’s critique of the 
Criminal Code’s “bias toward the use of incarceration” and its conclusion that “[a] number of 
difficulties arise if imprisonment is perceived to be the preferred sanction for most offences. 
Perhaps most significant is that although we regularly impose this most onerous and expensive 
sanction, it accomplishes very little apart from separating offenders from society for a period 
of time” (at xxiii-xxiv).
 109 Section 718.2(d).
 110 Section 718.2(e). 
 111 (1997), 119 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (B.C.C.A.).
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rejected this interpretation of s. 718.2(e), although the majority of the 
court, in reasons written by Justice Esson, concluded that the trial judge’s 
sentence ought not to be interfered with. Justice Rowles dissented in the 
result. She interpreted s. 718.2(e) as a parliamentary “recognition of the 
principle of restraint in the use of incarceration in sentencing.”112 She 
noted Canada’s comparatively high incarceration rate and emphasized 
the tremendously disproportionate incarceration of Aboriginal peoples 
in Canada, a fact referred to in innumerable public reports and scholarly 
writings. “Overrepresentation of the magnitude found in the studies,” 
Rowles J.A. found, “results, in part, from what is referred to as systemic 
discrimination.”113 Justice Rowles read s. 718.2(e), which emphasizes the 
attention that should be given to Aboriginal offenders, as an invitation for 
the “recognition and amelioration of the impact systemic discrimination 
has on aboriginal people,”114 a reflection of an emphasis on rehabilitation, 
and an opening for a new form of rehabilitation that would take account 
of the needs of the broader community – restorative justice. Although the 
Supreme Court would not disturb the trial judge’s sentence in Gladue,115 
the theory and interpretation of s. 718.2(e) offered by Justice Rowles was 
very much adopted and amplified, opening new avenues – regrettably 
not yet as robustly explored as we would hope – for an emphasis on 
rehabilitative sentencing and restorative justice with special attention 
to the unique history and circumstances of Aboriginal offenders and 
communities. 
CONCLUSION
The great constitutional scholar, advocate, and Canadian poet F.R. 
Scott painted a challenging and provocative picture of the practices of 
criminal punishment as he saw them in the mid-20th century:
III. Justice
This judge is busy sentencing criminals
Of whose upbringing and environment he is totally ignorant.
His qualifications, however, are the highest – 
A B.A. degree,
 112 Ibid. at para. 49. 
 113 Ibid. at para. 55.
 114 Ibid. at para. 56.
 115 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688.
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A technical training in Law,
Ten years practice at the Bar,
And membership in the right political party.
Who should know better than he
Just how many years in prison 
Will reform a slum-product,
Or whether ten or twenty strokes of the lash
Will put an end to assaults on young girls?116
As much as it is a critique of institutional hubris in the infliction of 
criminal punishment, Scott’s verse is also a call to attend to the theories 
about the causes of crime, the nature of human conduct, and just social 
responses to wrongdoing that invariably animate our criminal justice 
system.
 In this article we have explored the important role that the bcca 
has played in wrestling with what constitutes a just social response to 
criminal wrongdoing. The court’s work in this area has been rich, its 
views on sentencing as mercurial as the practices of punishment. At 
times the court has served quite directly as an institutional voice for 
dominant social views of punishment, whether they were of a more 
sternly retributive form or reflected an era of hope in rehabilitation. Yet, 
in more recent years, the jurisprudence of the court has also included 
strong voices expressing the kind of critical posture towards traditional 
assumptions in our theories and practices of sentencing that Scott would 
seem to commend. 
 Our current political climate finds a retributive ethos in the criminal 
law in ascendancy. We use preventative detention more now than ever. 
Recent governments have shown an appetite for more and harsher 
minimum sentences. Our prisons swell with overuse. Yet we are no 
safer as a result. In this context, the bcca will continue to serve as an 
important institutional player in the ongoing debate about the just and 
effective forms of criminal punishment. As it continues in its task of 
wrestling with the competing constellations of sentencing objectives 
in the criminal law, we hope that the court will also draw upon its 
own tradition and continue to push us to think more deeply, critically, 
and cautiously about the assumptions that tacitly guide our system of 
criminal justice. 
 116 From “Social Notes,” in F.R. Scott, Selected Poems (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1966) 
at 49.
